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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re:	)	Case No. 09-29162-D-11
	)	
SK FOODS, L.P.,	)	Docket Control No. SH-75
	)	
Debtor.	)	Date: January 24, 2011
	)	Time: 9:30 a.m.
	)	Dept: D
	)	

This memorandum decision is not approved for publication and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or the rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

On September 29, 2010, the chapter 11<sup>1</sup> trustee in this case, Bradley D. Sharp (the "trustee"), filed a Motion to Approve Compromise Between Trustee and Certain Holders of Unliquidated Claims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy [Procedure] 9019 (the "Motion"). The Motion was heard and continued, and on December 22, 2010, the trustee filed an Amended Agreement for Allowance of Claims ("Amended Agreement"), by which the proposed compromise was modified, as discussed below. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the Motion.

**I. THE COMPROMISE**

The claims proposed to be compromised are those of certain entities that, prior to the commencement of this chapter 11 case,

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Code, chapter, and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. All Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

1 had been engaged in litigation against the debtor. The claimants  
2 are:

3 (1) Bruce Foods Corp., Cliffstar Corp., Diversified Foods  
4 and Seasonings, Inc., and Four In One Co. Inc. (the "Class  
5 Representatives"), each on behalf of themselves and in their  
6 capacities as representatives of a class of similarly situated  
7 purchasers of tomato paste and other products described in Case  
8 Nos. 08-cv-03017 MCE, 08-cv-03074 MCE, 09-cv-00027 MCE, and 09-  
9 cv-00442 MCE, pending in the United States District Court for the  
10 Eastern District of California (the "Class Claims"), and

11 (2) Morning Star Packing Company, Inc. ("Morning Star"), a  
12 competitor of the debtor.

13 These parties have filed proofs of claim in this case in  
14 unspecified amounts; however, they have informally provided  
15 estimates to the trustee asserting claims: (1) for the Class  
16 Claims, in excess of \$100 million,<sup>2</sup> not including treble damages,  
17 punitive damages, or attorney's fees to which they may be  
18 entitled, and (2) for Morning Star, at least \$140 million, not  
19 including treble damages, punitive damages, or attorney's fees.

20 As reflected in the Amended Agreement, the compromise  
21 provides that each of the Class Claims and the Morning Star claim  
22 will be allocated into two allowed claims -- (a) a non-  
23 subordinated, liquidated general unsecured claim entitled to the  
24 same economic treatment as any other allowed non-subordinated  
25 general unsecured claim, and (b) a subordinated, liquidated

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26  
27 2. However, in his supplemental declaration, the trustee  
28 presents an analysis suggesting that the Class Claimants' actual  
damages may be in the range of \$45.48 million.

1 general unsecured claim.<sup>3</sup> The amounts of these claims will be:

	Non-Subordinated Claims	Subordinated Claims
3 Bruce Foods Corp.	\$2.65 million	\$14.85 million
4 Cliffstar Corp.	\$2.65 million	\$14.85 million
5 Diversified Foods	\$2.65 million	\$14.85 million
6 Four In One Company	\$2.65 million	\$14.85 million
7 Morning Star	\$7.65 million	\$43.35 million

## 8 II. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

9 The trustee contends the compromise is fair and equitable  
10 under applicable Ninth Circuit standards. The court agrees;  
11 application of the relevant factors will be discussed below.

12 Scott Salyer ("Salyer"), president of SK PM Corp., general  
13 partner of debtor SK Foods, L.P., together with various entities  
14 related to Salyer (collectively, the "Salyer entities") oppose  
15 the Motion. They contend that (1) the trustee has failed to make  
16 a prima facie showing of the relevant factors, and (2) the

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18 3. The parties originally agreed to compromise these claims  
19 at (1) for purposes of voting on a plan of reorganization, a  
20 total of \$70 million for the Class Claims and \$121 million for  
21 Morning Star, and (2) for purposes of distribution, a total of  
22 \$10.5 million for the Class Claims and \$18.15 million for Morning  
Star. In other words, the claims would be allowed at one amount  
for purposes of voting and a much lower amount for purposes of  
distribution -- an amount equal to 15% of the voting amount.

23 At the initial hearing, the court expressed its concern that  
24 allowing the claims at one amount for distribution purposes but  
25 at an amount more than six times higher for voting purposes  
26 appeared designed to manipulate the voting process; that is, it  
appeared to give these claimants voting power disproportionate to  
their true economic interests in the case and unfairly greater  
than the voting power of the other general unsecured creditors.

27 In response to the court's concerns, the trustee, the Class  
28 Representatives, and Morning Star modified the compromise as  
reflected in the Amended Agreement. The Amended Agreement  
addresses the court's concerns with the original agreement.

1 trustee's goals would be better met by estimating the claims.<sup>4 5</sup>

2 As with the trustee's earlier compromise with the Bank of  
3 Montreal, it is significant that no other parties have objected  
4 to the compromise, and that the Committee and the Bank of  
5 Montreal support the compromise.

6 The court finds that the Amended Agreement is no less  
7 favorable to all holders of claims than the compromise as  
8 originally proposed, in that its terms do not affect any creditor  
9 adversely, as compared with the original compromise, and thus, no  
10 further notice is required.

### 11 III. ANALYSIS

12 This court has jurisdiction over the request pursuant to 28  
13 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). The request is a core proceeding  
14 under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (O).

#### 15 A. Applicable Legal Standards

16 "The law favors compromise and not litigation for its own  
17 sake, and as long as the bankruptcy court amply considered the  
18

19 4. In response to the original compromise, the Salyer  
20 entities also contended that (1) the allowance of the claims for  
21 voting purposes at over 600% of their allowed amounts for  
22 distribution purposes was not permitted by the Code, and (2) the  
23 trustee had not justified class treatment of the claims. The  
24 first of these objections has been resolved by the Amended  
Agreement; the second, by the trustee's separate motion for class  
certification of the claims. The Salyer entities' objection to  
the class certification motion will be addressed in the court's  
decision on that motion.

25 5. In a portion of their argument, the Salyer entities  
26 discuss the Morning Star claim separately from the Class Claims.  
27 However, the substance of the arguments is the same, and the  
28 court finds no reason to distinguish the Morning Star claim from  
the Class Claims for purposes of this decision. Thus, the  
decision is to be taken as applicable to both the Morning Star  
claim and the Class Claims, even though the court may refer, for  
particular examples, only to one or the other.

1 various factors that determined the reasonableness of the  
2 compromise, the court's decision must be affirmed." In re A & C  
3 Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). "Rather than an  
4 exhaustive investigation or a mini-trial on the merits, the  
5 bankruptcy court need only find that the settlement was  
6 negotiated in good faith and is reasonable, fair and equitable."  
7 Sirtos v. Ray (In re Sirtos), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4894 at \*32  
8 (9th Cir. BAP 2006). The court's "proper role is 'to canvas the  
9 issues and see whether the settlement falls below the lowest  
10 point in the range of reasonableness.'" Id., quoting In re  
11 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 304 B.R. 395, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.  
12 2004).

13 **B. The Compromise is Fair and Equitable**

14 Although the bankruptcy court has "great latitude in  
15 approving compromise agreements," it may approve a compromise  
16 only if it is "fair and equitable." In re Woodson, 839 F.2d 610,  
17 620 (9th Cir. 1988), citing A & C Properties, 784 F.2d at 1381.  
18 In making this determination, the court must consider:

19 (a) The probability of success in the litigation; (b)  
20 the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the  
21 matter of collection; (c) the complexity of the  
22 litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and  
23 delay necessarily attending it; (d) the paramount  
24 interest of the creditors and a proper deference to  
25 their reasonable views in the premises.

23 Id.

24 In their opposition, the Salyer entities address only the  
25 first of these factors -- the probability of success in the  
26 litigation; in this regard, they complain that the evidence  
27 offered by the trustee is insufficient to make a prima facie  
28 showing. First, the Salyer entities challenge the trustee's

1 reliance on a plea agreement entered into between the Government  
2 and Randall Lee Rahal, on the basis that the agreement does not  
3 contain a sworn statement and constitutes inadmissible hearsay.  
4 Second, they contend the trustee "improperly assumes the truth"  
5 of the allegations in the proofs of claim filed by the Class  
6 Representatives "without having adequately investigated the  
7 merits of the Class Action claims and what possible defenses SK  
8 Foods may have against such claims."<sup>6</sup>

9       These objections represent a misunderstanding of the court's  
10 role in ruling on a compromise. The court is not required to  
11 rule on disputed issues of fact, but only to canvas the issues.  
12 Burton v. Ulrich (In re Schmitt), 215 B.R. 417, 423 (9th Cir. BAP  
13 1997). Thus, the court need not determine whether the charges  
14 against Rahal, as set forth in the plea agreement, are true; with  
15 that said, it is noteworthy for purposes of this decision that at  
16 least one individual alleged to have been heavily involved with  
17 the debtor has agreed to plead guilty to charges of racketeering,  
18 money laundering, and price fixing allegedly committed while he  
19 was an agent and director of the debtor. Indeed, the trustee has  
20 asserted and the defendants have not denied that four other  
21 individuals have plead guilty to similar charges.<sup>7</sup>

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23       6. Objection to Motion to Approve Compromise Between  
24 Trustee and Certain Holders of Unliquidated Claims Pursuant to  
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy [Procedure] 9019, filed October 13,  
2010 ("Objection"), at 4:4-7.

25       7. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of  
26 Motion to Approve Compromise Between Trustee and Certain Holders  
27 of Unliquidated Claims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy  
[Procedure] 9019, filed September 29, 2010 ("Memorandum"), at 2,  
n.2. The defendants themselves, in their motion to stay the  
28 trustee's adversary proceedings against them, brought to the  
(continued...)

1 The charges are outlined in considerable detail in the  
2 exhibit to the Rahal plea agreement -- they are substantially  
3 similar to the allegations of the Class Claims. Further, the  
4 trustee and the court are aware and the Salyer entities have not  
5 disputed that Salyer is facing similar charges. It was  
6 appropriate for the trustee to consider the fact that these  
7 charges have been brought and that at least five alleged  
8 participants have plead guilty. These factors clearly have a  
9 bearing on the trustee's expectations of the likelihood of  
10 success if he were to litigate the Class Claims.

11 Similarly, the trustee does not contend and the court need  
12 not determine that the proofs of claim are "proof" of the  
13 validity of the claims. Instead, the trustee correctly observes  
14 that the Class Representatives assert significant claims against  
15 the estate based on factual allegations that are virtually the  
16 same as the criminal charges that have been brought against  
17 several individuals associated with the debtor, to which at least  
18 five have plead guilty. The trustee also considered a  
19 declaration of FBI Special Agent Paul S. Artley containing an  
20 extremely detailed description of some of the evidence gathered  
21 during the Government's investigation. The trustee points out  
22 that there have been no facts offered that would appear to weaken

23  
24 7. (...continued)  
25 court's attention that criminal charges had been brought against  
26 not only Salyer but "ten other criminal defendants," alleging a  
27 pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the RICO  
28 statutes. Defendants' Motion to Stay Adversary Proceedings,  
filed April 28, 2010, at 7. The defendants submitted in support  
of that motion copies of the informations against Salyer and six  
of those other defendants. The Government's allegations in those  
documents track those made by the Class Representatives.



1 the Government's charges. Considering all these factors, the  
2 court concludes, with the trustee, that "there is a material risk  
3 that if the matter were litigated, SK Foods would be found to  
4 have engaged in the bribery and price-fixing activities that are  
5 the source of the Class Representatives' damage claims."<sup>8</sup>

6 Finally, the Salyer entities complain that the trustee has  
7 offered no factual basis for his conclusions as to the likely  
8 amounts of the Class Representatives' damages. On the contrary,  
9 the trustee provided an explanation of his figures in the  
10 Memorandum and considerably more detail in his reply to the  
11 Salyer entities' opposition. Given this level of detail, it is  
12 reasonable to conclude that the potential actual damages are very  
13 high. The Salyer entities have offered no contrary figures of  
14 their own and no reason to believe the potential damages are  
15 significantly lower than suggested by the trustee. Add to this  
16 that much of the conduct forming the basis of the Class Claims  
17 and Morning Star's claim is antitrust behavior for which treble  
18 damages and attorney's fees are generally available.

19 The trustee has succeeded in compromising these claims at  
20 amounts that are reasonable under all the circumstances,  
21 including, as discussed below, the likely costs of litigation,  
22 and the claimants have agreed to subordinate 85% of the allowed  
23 amounts of their claims to all other allowed claims. The  
24 subordination results in substantial benefit to the estate. The  
25 court concludes that the compromise amounts fall well within in  
26 the range of reasonableness.

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28 8. Memorandum, at 8:20-22.



1       Importantly, the Salyer entities' argument views the  
2 probability of success in litigation of the Class Claims and the  
3 Morning Star claim in isolation and without any meaningful  
4 consideration of the other A & C Properties factors; namely, the  
5 complexity of the litigation and the associated expense,  
6 inconvenience and delay, and the paramount interests of the  
7 creditors. Litigation of the claims, with their allegations of  
8 price fixing, bribery, and racketeering, would require extensive  
9 testimony by many witnesses. The damages aspects of the claims  
10 would require extremely complex analyses of product pricing  
11 structures, market shares, and lost profits. These factors weigh  
12 heavily in favor of the compromise.

13       As with the Bank of Montreal compromise, the court returns  
14 to the theme of diminishing returns in a situation like this one,  
15 where the estate consists solely of cash and litigation claims;  
16 namely, that every dollar spent investigating and litigating is a  
17 dollar out of the pockets of creditors. And as with the Bank of  
18 Montreal claim, litigation of the Class Claims and the Morning  
19 Star claims could well be so costly as to deplete the estate  
20 entirely, even to the extent of leaving the estate  
21 administratively insolvent. It is important to remember that in  
22 litigating the Class Claims and the Morning Star claim, the  
23 trustee would not be pursuing assets but litigating the amounts  
24 of claims against the estate. Thus, even if he prevailed and  
25 reduced the claims to much smaller amounts -- for the sake of  
26 argument, to zero, the battle would be a meaningless exercise if  
27 there is nothing left for either the Class Claimants, Morning  
28

1 Star, or the other creditors.<sup>9</sup> This cost-benefit analysis weighs  
2 heavily in favor of the compromise.

3 Next, the district court has ordered "a stay of all further  
4 bankruptcy proceedings where Appellants [the Salyer entities]  
5 make a credible showing that discovery from or testimony of Scott  
6 Salyer or his criminal counsel is relevant to the proceedings."<sup>10</sup>  
7 The stay would extend to the Class Claims and the Morning Star  
8 claim, with the result that discovery likely would not commence  
9 for several months, if not years, with trial even farther in the  
10 future.<sup>11</sup> This factor weighs in favor of the compromise.

11 Finally, the compromise serves the paramount interests of  
12 creditors and reflects a proper deference to their reasonable  
13 views. No parties other than the Salyer entities have opposed  
14 the compromise. Given that there is no evidence that the trustee  
15 would be likely to prevail in the litigation, the certainty that  
16 litigation would be expensive and time-consuming, and the  
17 likelihood that even a successful outcome would be substantially  
18 offset by the costs of achieving it, the court concludes that the  
19

20 9. "Basic to this process [of assessing a compromise] in  
21 every instance, of course, is the need to compare the terms of  
22 the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation."  
23 Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer  
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968). In this  
case, even successful litigation might well result in no reward  
at all to creditors.

24 10. Sharp v. SSC Farms 1, LLC (In re SK Foods, L.P.), CIV.  
NO. S-10-1492 (E.D. Cal.), Order, filed December 10, 2010.

25 11. The putative class actions have already been pending in  
26 the district court for over two years, but because of a series of  
27 stipulated stays, no discovery has been undertaken, the  
28 plaintiffs have not yet sought certification of the class, and  
the parties have not commenced settlement discussions. See Joint  
Status Report, filed July 16, 2010 in Four in One Company, Inc.  
v. SK Foods, L.P., Case No. CIV S-08-3017.

1 compromise is clearly well within the bounds of reasonableness  
2 and is fair and equitable.

3 **C. The Compromise is Preferable to Estimation**

4 The Salyer entities contend the Motion should be denied  
5 because the trustee has failed to consider estimation of the  
6 claims under § 502(c) as an alternative to the compromise.

7 The Trustee does not offer any explanation of why this  
8 remedy was not pursued, the cost-benefit analysis of  
9 such an approach, and what impact, positive or  
negative, there would be on distributions from such an  
approach.<sup>12</sup>

10 In the court's view, the answer is simple. The compromise  
11 is far preferable to estimation, at least in this case, because  
12 it will avoid the need for, if not a trial, at least a certain  
13 amount of discovery and an evidentiary hearing that would likely  
14 be required for the court to be in a position to estimate the  
15 claims. Discovery would be subject to the district court's stay  
16 order, and thus, the estimation process could be years down the  
17 road. Further, there is no reason to suppose that estimating  
18 what could be over 200 claims on an individual basis would not be  
19 as costly and time-consuming as individual trials. The Salyer  
20 entities have not suggested and the court can conceive of no  
21 possible benefit to be gained by estimating the claims rather  
22 than compromising them.

23 / / /

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
27  
28 12. Objection, 11:10-12.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court concludes that all the relevant A & C Properties factors weigh in favor of the compromise,<sup>13</sup> and thus, that the compromise is fair and equitable.

The court will enter an appropriate order.

Dated: Jan. 27, 2011



ROBERT S. BARDWIL  
United States Bankruptcy Judge

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13. The second factor -- the difficulties to be encountered in collection -- is not relevant as the trustee would not be pursuing affirmative claims but defending the estate from claims against it.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Andrea Lovgren, in the performance of my duties as Deputy Clerk to the Honorable Robert S. Bardwil, mailed by ordinary mail a true copy of the attached document to each of the parties listed below:

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DATE: January 27, 2011

  
Deputy Clerk